NATO: Beyond Collective Defense, Part V: The no win wars of internationalism: Korea

By Steve Farrell
web posted June 1999

In November of 1951, American General Douglas MacArthur triumphantly completed his reversal of the communist takeover of North Korea and their subsequent Chinese led and Soviet ordered invasion of South Korea, and won the war.

In what was "one of the greatest displays of military genius in history," MacArthur had attacked the enemy's rear, with an impossible amphibious assault at Inchon, far up the Korean Peninsula. Drove the communists "pellnell" to the Manchurian border, and remarkably, in eight weeks time, liberated South Korea, which was his objective, and North Korea, which was above and beyond the call of duty. In the process, relatively few Americans (compared to what followed) lost their lives. It was a fantastic victory. 1

There was due cause for celebration.

But the celebration never came. Red China, upset with its loss, now massed its hordes upon the borders of North Korea at the Yalu River and began to flood its men, tanks, and military hardware (Military hardware acquired from Russia, who received it as a post WW2 gift from Truman) over the Yalu River Bridges, head on into North Korea, MacArthur, and his men. A new war had begun in earnest.

The solution for MacArthur and company was simple. Bomb the bridges. Red China lacked the technological ability to successfully launch an invasion across the river without them.

Common military sense, a respect for human life on both sides of the conflict, the granting of time to secure Korean liberty, all bore witness that this was the intelligent, the moral, and the instinctive thing to do.

But intelligence, morality, and instinct somehow managed to flea from Korea from that moment forward. President Harry Truman and a questionable list of State Department buddies, apparently were not very happy with MacArthur's success. Pretending that MacArthur had not been fighting the Chinese all along, and that his actions would provoke China into the war, MacArthur was ordered not to bomb the bridges, and thus not adequately protect his men and his victory against a much larger invading force. Call it whatever else you want, Democrat Harry Truman ordered the abandonment of our troops in the field, and altered the methods and objectives of war.

The bloodiest battles of the Korean War ensued; tens of thousands of American soldiers died; North Korea had its recently won liberty stripped, and MacArthur was dismissed as an American rebel (even a Caesar), for voicing his very legitimate protest through what were proper and discreet channels.

But Truman, a dedicated internationalist, and the man who started this war without the consent of Congress, was the true Caesar, and possible traitor to his people. Not only did he permit China to launch a full scale invasion which could have been averted, but he then gave them other advantages by further altering the rules and objectives of war.

Among these was the outrageous implementation of what today we call "UN Safe Areas," or, what was called in Vietnam the "Demilitarized Zone." This was a place where the enemy, after launching its vicious volleys, could run and hide without fear of reprisal. It was against the law to kill and maim there, but China could kill and maim us at their leisure. 2

Call it military socialism, for it was an attempt to level the playing field, converting handicap into privilege, bestowing an unwarranted advantage on an unworthy and unholy opponent, who wouldn't have stood a chance otherwise, as if to pretend this was some sort of competitive sport where parity only added to the excitement.

This aid-to-the-enemy strategy, also, forbade enlisting the volunteer help of Chinese Nationalists who were anxious to strike back at their communist masters, and later introduced, after MacArthur was booted out, a reversal of the historical and universal tactical objective of territorial acquisition, in favor of one which repeatedly and intentionally required our troops to retreat and abandon strategic territory won with blood, sweat, and tears. 3

Measures like these went beyond ignorance and lunacy. MacArthur stated later: "I realized for the first time, that I had actually been denied the use of my full military power to safeguard the lives of my soldiers and the safety of my army."

"Such a limitation on the utilization of available military force to repel an enemy attack," he declared, "has no precedent, either in our own history, or, so far as I know, in the history of the world." 4

General Mark Clark took the point further: "Perhaps communists had wormed their way deeply into our government." 5 Later investigations into the State Department and the Truman Administration, in general, only added fuel to Clark's claims.

Some of those communists, however, worked not in Washington, but in Manhattan, at the headquarters of that world "peace" organization they call the United Nations, under whose direction and blessing this war was launched and fought..

John F. McManus, in his hard hitting expose "Changing Commands: The Betrayal of America's Military," explains: "It was Soviet UN Official, General Yuri Vasilev, [who] left his post at UN headquarters in... January 1950 and moved to North Korea, where he directed the military buildup of the communist forces. A U.S. department of Defense release of May 15, 1954, even claimed that Vasilev had given the order in 1950 for the North Koreans to invade."

He continues: "All military directives sent from Washington and the Pentagon to military commanders in Korea were also supplied to several offices at the UN, including the Military Staff Committee, formerly led by Vasilev and then led by another Soviet General, Ivan Skliar. Everything the US commanders were doing was know to communist leaders even before actions were taken."

Generals James Van Fleet and MacArthur, testifying before Congress, were convinced this was so, and were also convinced, said Van Fleet, "that there must have been information to the enemy from high diplomatic authorities that we would not attack his home base across the Yalu." 6

Evidence later emerged.

Chinese General Lin Pia, the commander of the Chinese troops, which slaughtered so many Americans revealed in a leaflet distributed in China:

"I would never have made the attack and risked my men and military reputation if I had not been assured that Washington would restrain General MacArthur from taking adequate retaliatory measures against my lines of supply and communication." 7

If then MacArthur had been permitted to bomb the bridges, as was his plan, the war would have been over, North Korea would be free today not a threat, tens of thousands of American soldiers would have come home to a victory parade rather than a funeral procession, communism would have been put on notice to watch its step, and MacArthur would be remembered for what he was - a true American hero.

But then good things like that don't happen when you join hands with thugs, communists, and international terrorists and dare to call your band a peacekeeping organization. And so the communists won, American soldiers died, thousands of POW's were abandoned, and an international standing army was installed in South Korea as a check against the instability of a third rate criminal ring in North Korea, which annually starves its people, threatens its neighbors, and receives subsidies from the United Nations Organization which first promoted and now preserves its continued existence.

Korea was the first in a series of No-Win Wars fought by the United States under the advice and direction of New World Order dreamers. Wars whose intention never was victory, but only to advance the pull for alliance.

Steve Farrell is a Senior Associate Editor with Right Magazine. Please e-mail your comments to Mr. Farrell at

1. Stormer John A. "None Dare Call It Treason," The Liberty Bell Press, Missouri, 1964.
2. Ibid.
3. McManus, John F., "Changing Commands: The Betrayal of America's Military," The John Birch Society, Appleton, Wisconsin.
4. MacArthur, Douglas, "Reminiscences," New York Times, Inc., New York, 1964.
5. Clark, Mark. ""From the Danube To the Yalu," Harper & Brothers, New York, 1954.
6. "Interlocking Subversion in Governments Departments," Hearings, U.S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, 1954; ""Military Situation in the Far East," Committee on Armed Forces, 1951.
7. MacArthur, Reminiscences," New York Times, Inc., New York, 1964.


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