Democratic commonwealth

By James Ruhland
web posted March 29, 2004 

I write not to praise the UN, but to bury it. But how many such
articles have people written over the years? The last several
years have seen a multitude of "this is the end of the UN" pieces,
but still it persists and at least half the country and much of the
world regards it as a source of moral legitimacy. This despite the
facts that fly in the face of the UN's image as an institution of
cooperative high-minded nobility in action. In Reason, Johnathan
Rauch's article "Voting Block" describes formation of a
Democratic Caucus that might lead not to the end of the UN, but
to its reform. Is reform within the structure of the UN likely, or
even possible?

The problems with the UN are based in the compromises
necessary in founding it with the cooperation of the Soviet world.
In the current era, it is ever more apparent that the UN's vices
are inherent, its virtues accidental. The essential problem is that in
practice the UN is morally neutral between dictatorships and
democratic republics – where it does not actually privilege the
former over the later. It treats regimes like Libya and Syria as
having as much standing to serve on a Human Rights
Commission as any other country. The UN's Oil for Blood
program in Iraq was run with a mafia-style skim into the billions
of dollars of corrupt payoffs and vote-buying. The UN's
structure encourages such venality and more often than not
serves as an instrument for the defense of dictatorship rather than
democracy. It invokes international law most strenuously against
not the world's rogue regimes, but those who would oppose
them, against the fire brigade rather than the fire.

Will a "caucus of democracies" change that? It is the first step in
the right direction, but in the end that step is towards a post-UN
world. The problem with a "democratic caucus" in the UN as it
stands is that not all democracies act alike on the international
stage. Some are almost as irresponsible as the dictatorships they
are in league with, and others simply do not want to upset their
tyrannical regional fellows. France essentially behaves as a rogue
regime itself, and as with other rogue regimes invokes
international law to restrain others but exempts itself from these
norms. France uses the UN and its Security Council vote to
shield their dealings with other rogue regimes around the world
and fill the coffers of their elites with funds from, for example, the
aforementioned Oil-for-Blood program. That program was
administered by the UN on behalf of French and Russian
interests and the Ba'athists in Iraq. Elsewhere, South Africa may
be a democracy, but they will not vote in a way that would upset
Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Many Latin American countries
will refuse to cast votes that offend Hugo Chavez or Fidel
Castro. Indeed, they will likely insist that Chavez be treated as a
democrat in good standing.

The UN's problem is its tradition of regionalism and logrolling
and the fact that, as an institution, it treats all governments
equally, from the most representative and accountable to the
most dictatorial and oppressive. Rauch points this out but does
not highlight sufficiently the degree to which this will make the
"Community of Democracies" ineffective within the UN. I believe
that the more responsible members of the just formed
"democratic caucus" will eventually find themselves frustrated,
and look outside for a means of organizing their efforts. Rauch
writes that "[b]y the time the Community of Democracies
becomes strong enough to act coherently inside the U.N., it will
also be strong enough to act coherently outside the U.N", but
within the UN's democratic caucus the flaws of the UN generally
are repeated, as all democracies are treated equally. But as I
mentioned, they do not all behave the same. The more
responsible ones will find that they will have to operate outside
the UN. They will not be able to act coherently within the UN to
accomplish their goals, given its structural incentives and
disincentives.

Free market conservatives believe that incentives are important.
In the UN as it stands, the incentive structure is skewed to
reward irresponsibility and unaccountability. It promotes an
international "free rider" problem. Ultimately we should replace
the UN with a "Commonwealth of Democracies" founded on
two pillars. The first is that only democratic nations can
participate in decision making. Other nations may be our allies,
but will have no vote internationally until their citizens have a
meaningful vote at home. The second pillar is the principle of
putting your money and men where your mouth is: only those
who are prepared to contribute meaningfully to an effort will
have a right to consultation on it. This means that non-
participants like France or Germany, conscientious objectors in
the combating of threats to the western world, cannot play the
obstructionist role they currently play in the UN. Nations like
Britain, Australia and Poland would qualify, and nations like
Canada, India, and Japan would have new incentives to enhance
their contributions to global security.

Countries will thereby be encouraged to sufficiently fund defense.
Nations like India and Japan who are currently pushing for
representation on the UN's Security Council will have their
incentives altered. Right now, these nations feel the need to
placate a France or Russia – or even a China – because of the
influence those nations have in the running of the UN. Currently,
the structure of the "international community" and its institutions
creates incentives to work against rather than cooperate with the
United States and its allies. This needs to be changed and would
be in a system based on the pillars of democratic accountability
and responsibility in spending resources. In addition, a
"commonwealth of democracies" would not coerce its members.
Any nation that did not want to participate in a venture would not
be coerced or bullied into doing so, as is often the case with the
UN's system and the treaties sponsored by the "world
community," such as Kyoto or the International Criminal Court.

The most important change is that no longer would international
institutions be invoked in the defense of dictatorship at the
expense of democracy, and votes would not be stacked in such
a way that democratic republics are condemned for defending
themselves against aggressor states or terrorists that blow up
their citizens. Responsibility and accountability would be
encouraged, whereas the UN as it stands discourages both.
Ultimately, any "Community of Democracies" within the UN, the
decent members at least, will find themselves agreeing with
Rauch when he writes that "perhaps—one can dream—it may
someday be the U.N.'s successor." But for any Commonwealth
of Democracies to function, it will need to learn from the UN's
mistakes, and establish an incentive structure that will make it
function properly.

James Ruhland is the author of the blog Porphyrogenitus. 

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