The Return of History and the End of Dreams The more things change By Steven Martinovich
"We have an entered an age of divergence," declares Robert Kagan in his latest tour de force The Return of History and the End of Dreams. It is likely a bitter pill for those who dreamed of Francis Fukuyama's "end of history," an era of peace dividends, alliances with old enemies and a world more interested in deliberation than war – a new millennia which marked the final victory of liberal democracy over totalitarian ideologies. A funny thing happened on the way to history of course. Islamist terrorists launched murderous attacks on the United States, Spain, England, Africa and Bali. Two American-led wars with long timelines for withdrawal have been launched in predominantly Muslim nations. Russia and China have risen to challenge America's global political, economic and military leadership, there is either a perceived or real decline in the U.S. economy and the American people themselves seem uncertain how to respond to all of these challenges. Kagan argues that the short-lived era of nations competing with each other economically has once again given way to the old game of geopolitics – back to a world of clashing national interests. Instead of communism, liberal democracies have to deal with the threat of autocratic regimes – Russia and China primarily – who view the expansion of an international liberal order as aggression. Concern for democracy and human rights, the autocrats believe, threatens the old notion of Westphalian sovereignty. And while they don't export an ideology per se, autocracies export their example of strong central government combined with limitations of freedom – all to preserve "order" and continuation of power – to their client states. Unsettling the autocracies, the end of the Cold War saw the U.S. become more interventionist in world affairs. It has sought – or at least been perceived that way – dominance on all theatres across the globe and practiced old-fashioned power politics, though often more in words than deeds. This despite that many, including wide portions of the American public, hoped the U.S. could give up its "sheriff" role after the fall of the Soviet Union in favour of a multilateral, internationalist approach to problem solving. Nor will trade likely be the path to ameliorate tensions between democracies and autocracies. Kagan argues that while no one autocracy can defeat the United States either militarily or through economic means, some – notably China – are greatly dependent on the American market. As already witnessed by the simmering economic war over China's devaluing of the Yuan, even relatively minor issues can actually exacerbate tensions. In Europe, nations are already discovering that depending on Russia for oil and gas is carrying a price which includes a greater voice in their decision making. So how does the West deal with a new pragmatic autocracy – one which has kept the lid on political aspirations while still bringing a measure of material wealth – which doesn't fear organizations like NATO for its military power, as Kagan argued in a recent Washington Post essay – but rather the spread of democracy it represents? Kagan's 21st Century agenda for democracies is one that largely draws from the Cold War years. He proposes an alliance of democracies like Canada, the U.S., Japan and India, among others, which would complement NATO and the United Nations. He argues that liberal nations need to continue promoting democracy for nations like Russia and China and to intervene to promote the same in the Middle East, even if that means assisting in the overthrow of regimes friendly to the United States. Critics are likely either praise or dismiss The Return of History and the End of Dreams as a "new" or more "realistic" neoconservatism, perhaps demonstrating that they never fully understood what that conservative strain's founders were really arguing. Regardless, what Kagan's latest truly represents is a clarion call to those who believe that it is possible to peacefully coexist with autocracies, that negotiation and trade are the only tools necessary to bring autocracies into the fold of democracy. If Kagan isn't convincing enough, perhaps the words of Sergei Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister, will be. In an essay last year he argued that, "[F]or the first time in many years, a real competitive environment has emerged on the market of ideas for the future world order that are compatible with the present stage of global development" one that sees competition between different "value systems and development models." They don't sound like the words of someone open to accepting liberal democracy and human rights. Steven Martinovich is a freelance writer in Sudbury, Ontario, Canada. Buy The Return of History and the End of Dreams at Amazon.com for only $13.57 (32% off) Other related essays:
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