What is behind South Africa's anti-Israel lawfare campaign?By Irina Tsukerman Since Durban's 2001 World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) devolved into an antisemitic farce, South Africa has squandered the moral authority of overcoming apartheid by pursuing a perverse Soviet-Russian campaign against the Jewish State. After October 7, 2023, this effort accelerated with cases designed to enlist the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice in cynically accusing Israel of war crimes shortly after Hamas's genocidal attacks. Despite extensive documentation—including harrowing video and confessions revealing Hamas's brutality, murder, and sex crimes—the ICJ's provisional order called for Israel to cease operations in the Gaza Strip generally and specifically in Rafah, on allegations of "genocide." No mention was made of Hamas's Israeli hostages or continuing attacks. This decision follows and closely mirrors the ICC's recent recommendation for the arrest of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, equating them to Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar and the now neutralized Mohammed Deif (yet not to the Hamas political leadership in Doha). For now, the ICC is still considering the request of the prosecutor to issue arrest warrants. Several states have joined South Africa in proceedings at the ICJ on the "genocide" allegations. Critics of both politicized institutions have correctly pointed to their records of bias, antisemitic and anti-Israel sentiments, and corruption. However, another common connection that the ICC and ICJ share is to South Africa's anti-Israel lobby campaigns, including a probable triangulated coordination between South Africa, the two courts, and several pro-Iran, pro-Hamas, pro-Qatar, and pro-Muslim Brotherhood nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Since South Africa took the unusual step of bringing Israel to court over allegations of "genocide" in Gaza, many lawyers, analysts, and journalists questioned the financing of such a scheme, pointing to possible bribes by Iran and Qatar. Indeed, South Africa's ties to Tehran and Hamas have been the subject of scrutiny for months. One early report raised questions about the dubious financial schemes enabling South Africa to pursue politicized legal campaigns amidst an economic and energy crisis, and exposed how South African banks are providing a platform for Hamas funding. A far more sinister network of highly cloistered, politically incestuous relationships exists among a handful of families comprising the bulk of South Africa's foreign policy elites. This report, for the first time, uncovers evidence showing how South Africa's weakened, but still ruling, African National Congress (ANC) party has obscured its ties to terrorist and extremist organizations and Iran through complex schemes that genuinely deserve to be scrutinized by the international community. The ANC's Cast of Corrupt Characters Even though Muslims comprise only approximately three percent of South Africa's population, the top leadership and critical positions in the foreign policy establishment, as well as other central positions, are dominated by Muslim Brotherhood followers and proponents. Several families with close ties to the ANC, which lost its dominance for the first time in the June 2024 elections, are at the forefront of many of the controversies involving anti-Israel actions, close dealings with Iran, Russia, and Hamas, and an overall ongoing orgy of corruption plaguing the government and the party. The nature of these connections can be explained by the Muslim Brotherhood's hierarchical and serpentine structure. This organization is exclusivist and entirely dependent on familial ties due to concerns with trust. As with any mafia, the Muslim Brotherhood benefits from layers of financial and political obfuscations while entrenching its interests through government, corporate, and civil society. The former leading anti-Israel, anti-American spokesperson of the ANC hierarchy in South Africa, Grace Naledi Mandisa Pandor, who has served as Minister of International Relations and Cooperation since 2019, threatened to arrest any dual citizens serving in the IDF after October 7, upon their return to the country. Pandor converted to Islam before marrying in Botswana and pursuing a path that led her to the upper echelons of power. Her public career is not likely to end with the ministry. She may become a candidate for an influential international institution at the United Nations, the African Union, or even BRICS, the intergovernmental organization comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates. Another key player in South Africa's ruling mafia is Pandor's brother, Zolani Kgosietsile "Kgosie" Matthews, an independent executive director at enX Group and Zarclear Holdings. Matthews was formerly the Group Chief Executive Officer at the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa and Chairman of the Ports Regulator. He held other sensitive government-related positions and was the executive chair of the now-defunct Thea Laboratories, once one of the biggest companies in South Africa. Most importantly, he was councilor of South Africa's Independent Communications Authority at the peak of the MTN telecom scandal, when the communications giant was accused of paying bribes to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. MTN faced terror charges over being suspected of facilitating attacks in Iran and Afghanistan. The security scandal, however, was only the tip of the iceberg for MTN, which also had to pay billions in fines to Nigeria over violations involving failure to disconnect unregistered users from Nigeria's network. MTN retained the services of the Obama administration's former Attorney General, Eric Holder, to defend themselves. Matthews' meteoric rise and ability to evade accountability speaks to South Africa's systemic institutional corruption. Another pivotal role in the South African elite belongs to Naledi's husband, Sharif Joseph Pandor. Sharif Pandor encapsulates the extent to which political power and business influences have blended and have become ensconced in a few hands who have direct control over nearly all aspects of the South African economy. Sharif Pandor has led a manganese mining company in partnership with counterparts from China, and together with his son, Haroon Pandor, runs the Risco Group and Falaah Farms. The Pandor mining consortium, including the aforementioned project and a platinum operation, Nkwe Platinum, is mired in scandals, including the apparent "doctoring" of account books. When the founder of Nkwe's Australian office, Peter Landau, was sentenced to five years in prison for financial crimes, Pandor resigned but continued the "strawman" method of using third parties to advance his economic interests through illicit activity at no direct risk to himself. Sharif Pandor has used a British passport and his assorted contacts to help his wife, Naledi, accumulate significant wealth. At least three of her homes are registered to family members since she was precluded from owning these assets due to her government role. Sharif Pandor also travels where his wife's presence would attract scrutiny. For instance, in 2022, he traveled to Kazakhstan for either business or political dealings. Kazakhstan has become a significant hub for sanctions evasion by both Russia and Iran. The Pandor family and the ANC have strong connections with both countries, making it plausible that these trips were a cover for nefarious negotiations. Much of Russia's activity on the African continent is in mining, including those of the sanctioned Kremlin-aligned oligarch Víktor Vekselberg, whose South Africa-based United Manganese of Kalahari has been linked to Chancellor House, an ANC "funding front" to evade sanctions. Predictably, Vekselberg has contributed generously to the ANC. So far, however, the vast corruption and the willingness to enter dalliances with rogue actors have served the Pandor family well. The family reportedly owns a vast network of companies, including a sizeable biomedical company in South Africa with offices in 18 other countries. Though South African regulations restrict cabinet ministers to two cars and "the total purchase price for the car or cars chosen by ministers may not exceed 70 percent of a minister's annual remuneration package," Naledi Pandor held five luxury cars during her period of service. In addition, an aura of suspicious activity lingers over other Pandor family projects. For example, Sharif Pandor's fertilizer farms, owned with his son Fazloor Pandor and organized by his son Haroon Pandor, appear to be a cover for the ANC's illicit trade with Iran. Though Iran is a major fertilizer producer, exporting $1.8 billion worth of chemical fertilizers in the 2021-2022 crop year to become the world's 11th biggest chemical fertilizer exporter, it regularly and suspiciously imports significant quantities of fertilizer from South Africa. Most notably, Sharif Pandor's mining interests include manganese, platinum, uranium, and cobalt, used for batteries, electric vehicles (EVs), and military production. Pandor's potentially illicit activity does not end there. Sharif Pandor was involved with notable organized crime figures before 2005, including a South African mining magnate with close links to factions in the ruling ANC, who was embroiled in allegations of corporate fraud and misconduct, the extent of which was revealed only after he was shot dead. Sharif Pandor was a beneficiary of an irregular deal put together by Brett Kebble, from whom Pandor received almost a million rand. Kebble, who was murdered, managed to escape prosecution despite being described as one of the world's greatest unprosecuted frauds. Pandor was one of the top beneficiaries of this fraudulent empire. Similarly, Malcolm Mabaso, a partner and adviser to the ANC, and specifically to Sharif Pandor, has been heavily involved in moving and laundering the proceeds of diverse projects. Linda Mabaso, the Chair of Transnet, spearheaded a plan to build a significant South Africa railway, yet the tenders she attained were fraudulent. The Pandors' daughter, Aisha Pandor, now based in the United States, founded the SweepSouth domestic help service in South Africa. She and her husband also own a bioscience company allegedly tied to informal money relocation. However, Aisha's importance is limited to the financial aspects of the nepotistic ANC operations. The Mandela Link The most important, albeit former, political figure with ANC ties is Zwelivelile "Mandla" Mandela, the tribal chief of the Mvezo Traditional Council and the rogue grandson of Nelson Mandela. Mandla converted to Islam in 2016 upon marrying a Muslim woman. He is one of the leading voices supporting Hamas and Hizbullah, linking Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas interests in South Africa. Mandla has utilized various inherited institutions, such as the Mandela Foundation, to promote these interests while playing a leading social and political function as one of the legacy heirs of Nelson Mandela. He has capitalized on the deference given to the memory of his grandfather to advance political causes otherwise foreign and even hostile to the national interests of South Africa and the Mandela legacy. Mandla Mandela's Instagram page and posts show his support for IRGC Quds Unit Commander Qasem Soleimani and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. Mandla is not the only son of ANC leaders to support Islamists. Yusha Duarte, Yasmin "Jessie" Duarte's son, has affiliations with South Africa's State Security Agency and was linked to the Gupta scandal involving a China railroad contract, yet moves easily between the United States, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and South Africa. His mother, "Comrade Jessie" (née Dangor, sister of Zane and Mohammed Dangor, both highly influential anti-Israel diplomats within the Department of International Relations and Cooperation – "DIRCO"), was a communist South African politician and acting Secretary-General of the African National Congress who, besides being a longtime anti-apartheid activist and staunch anti-Israel activist until her death in July 2022, also supported Islamists. Mandla Mandela's post on Instagram. "The grandson of South Africa's Nelson Mandela chanted 'Free Free Palestine' during his speech at the CHAN games opening on Friday, also proclaiming solidarity with Western Sahara." (Islam Channel on YouTube) John Duarte, Jessie's late husband, also exploited family connections, including his son-in-law's involvement in various shady dealings facilitated by Mabaso. Media exposure to these scandals has not curtailed this activity. Instead, limited public regrets were elicited. Zane Dangor, Jessie's brother, is another figure with a surprising list of posts, including Director General of DIRCO, Special Adviser to the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Chief Operations Officer of DIRCO, and interim representative to the African Union. Like many others in the top ANC circles, Zane Dangor supported Islamists and worked closely with Naledi Pandor and the new foreign minister, Ronald Lamola. Mandla Mandela, Nelson Mandela's grandson served on the Executive Committee of the League of Parliamentarians for Al-Quds and Palestine.There have been many irregular developments on the watch of these "power families," which, independently of each other, would have raised red flags but, taken together, exhibit a pattern of manipulation, deception, and cover-ups. These developments include an oddly-timed South Africa peacekeeping mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which was seemingly inappropriate during South Africa's energy crisis. The mission has been linked to South Africa's Patrice Motsepe, the South African President's brother-in-law, who has mining interests in the DRC and other territories, which may be a site of the transfer of military equipment and natural resources, such as cobalt, to Iran and other customers. Irregularities in maritime activity show signs of foul play. A Russian cargo ship, the Lady R, mysteriously appeared at a South African naval base in Simon's Town on the evening of December 6, 2022, halfway through its circumnavigation of Africa, after turning off its marine tracking system south of Agulhas the day before, in an unexpected and controversial maneuver. The cargo ship, already under U.S. sanctions and refused service at the Ngqura-Port Elizabeth as a result, was allowed to load South African weapons for use by Russia against Ukraine with an Emirati company's facilitation and under a high-security detail; this became known as the "Lady Russia Gate" scandal after the allegations were made public by U.S. Ambassador Reuben Brigety. South Africa denied the weapons transfer, even as the "non-aligned" country's top general met his Russian counterpart in Moscow to discuss expanded military cooperation a week after the U.S. Ambassador's statement. Internal Political Strife? The potentially deadly rivalry between former South African President Jacob Zuma's and current President Cyril Ramaphosa's political camps has dimensions far beyond internal palace intrigue. The recent elections' political repercussions could determine the ANC's long-term future. Key ANC members have benefited from another MTN scandal involving Nigeria and Uganda and a $4 billion deal with Iran featuring gross mismanagement, the purloining of funding, and improper reporting. With President Ramaphosa on MTN's board of directors at the time, the optics were even worse. Rather than divesting himself from business interests, Ramaphosa strategically placed all his personal interests in trusts and suspicious offshore accounts. MTN's biggest business deal was with Iran, and its players were directly connected to South Africa's elite ruling ANC party. Despite his scandalous history, former President Jacob Zuma and his new political party, suspected of receiving financial support from Russian influencers, remain a powerful figure in South African politics. The Iranian Connection If South Africa's ruling elite is receiving compensation for its lawfare operations against Israel, it is likely via indirect, carefully concealed, and seemingly unrelated personal financial dealings. A specific quid pro quo is difficult to trace without an extensive investigation. However, all existing indicators point to an extensive mutually beneficial infrastructure, a depth of financial ties, and a framework for fraud, providing plausible conduits for such exchanges. Several factors have contributed to the flourishing relations between Iran and South Africa over the last few decades. First, a network of trusted associates is in place. The close-knit, even familial ties, among the ANC leadership and its long, legacy-linked hold on power in South Africa creates a perfect political storm for exploitation by a regime seeking opaque options for expanding its sphere of influence. The second factor is the recent reinvention of the otherwise faltering BRICS alliance as an economic vehicle for circumventing sanctions on Russia and export-import controls, particularly over technology exchanges. BRICS provides various avenues to evade Western scrutiny and the impact of tightened financial controls, whether its proposed bank and currency become a reality. South Africa may not be the most robust economy among BRICS members, but it is quite active in Africa, has a long record of success in obfuscating financial investigations, and was particularly welcoming to Iran as a prospective new member. Sharing this multilateral infrastructure is taking the relationship to a new level. The third factor contributing to strengthening these ties is the existence of specialized routes for facilitating bilateral financial corruption. These routes range from shell corporations with deep ties to the Iranian regime, such as One Vision Investments, to more byzantine structures, such as the ubiquitous apparent sale of Persian carpets in small stores set up across South Africa. Although these carpets are not typically a big-selling product in South Africa, they are a convenient cover for money laundering and plausible meeting places for private exchanges and deals. A significant and largely unexamined nexus for illicit money laundering are charities and insurance companies acquired with Iran's involvement and managed by the ANC elite, second and third-tier associates. The list of associates involved in these projects seems endless. To mention a few outstanding names, One Vision Investments' Nazem Ahmad (who has Beirut ties) is wanted by the U.S. Department of Justice as being a U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)-designated Hizbullah financier. There has also been a triangulation between the Russian oligarchs Viktor Vekselberg, Dimitri Gordin, and Konstantin Sadovnik, who run the Kalahari manganese mines and alloy mining projects. They do this primarily through the Sharif Pandor's consortium and others. Iran's trade with South Africa is linked to dozens of companies engaged in products and services, ranging from data systems to forensics to shipping companies and the media, such as the pro-Hamas Media Review Network, based in South Africa. At the same time, Ramaphosa was Chairman of MTN, while Christian Kilowan, the Chairman of AMOSS Payments, was Managing Director of MTN in Iran. South Africa's MTN received a license, a contract paid for by bribes and weapons, and ultimately, an Irancell MTN license for arms dealing. The ANC front companies generally have multiple subsidiaries, which makes tracing transactions a complex and intimidating process. Some have ties to both the South African government and Iran, including Denel SOC, which is suspected of working directly with the Iranian military. In 2012, photos emerged showing an Iranian drone in Syria bearing a remarkable resemblance to its South African counterpart. One of the projects Iran was reportedly interested in more recently was acquiring a surface-to-air missile system manufactured by Denell. Reportedly, the former Defense Minister, Patrick Lekota, cultivated close ties with Iran. Similarly, Abdul Minty, the top nuclear envoy for South Africa, traveled to Iran in 2007 for unclear reasons. Has South Africa facilitated Iran's nuclear weapons program? Such connections bear closer scrutiny but remain largely ignored in public discourse. Iran's corporations also share ties with South Africa. In the field of telecommunications, Iran's sphere of influence has penetrated South Africa. Telcom, for instance, affords a significant connection between South Africa and Iran, providing the latter with access to data, services, surveillance possibilities, data cloud, and artificial intelligence. Yet another company with financial ties to Iran is SPI International, a company sanctioned for transporting Iranian petrochemicals. Pension funds are also lucrative enterprises, and Iran's pension system comprises 18 contributory funds, which provide defined benefit (DB) pensions. SPI International Proprietary Ltd (SPII), the leading Chemical & Petrochemical Marketing and Distribution Company owned by SATA Investment Co. (SHASTAN), is the third largest of Iran's pension funds. The United States has sanctioned this joint Iranian/South African company for terror, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and human rights violations. Notably, South Africa's energy and chemical giant held a 50 percent stake in Arya Sasol, a joint venture with Iran's National Petrochemical Company. Iran has agreed with South Africa to "develop and equip" five refineries in South Africa. Iran's then-President Ebrahim Raisi confirmed this deal on August 25, 2023. Iran has long been involved in South African politics and business, building up an entire South African infrastructure that runs mainly through investment holdings and workers' health funds. A key example is the Iranian Dr. Mohamed Fazel Randera, the Chair of Workers Health in South Africa, Deputy Chair at the National Institute of Health in New Investment Holdings, a non-executive director of the Exaro Resources Ltd. (a petrochemical industry), the former Inspector General for South African's intelligence services, and a member of the Veterans League. Significantly, Randera served time in prison with Nelson Mandela, suggesting foreign infiltration of the ANC from its earliest days. Dr. Randera is a co-shareholder alongside Tsepho Malapo, a former Military Intelligence officer and the founder of Bohn South Africa. The Bohn company specializes in international technology, such as surveillance equipment, frequently appearing at intelligence gatherings, and offering services in geolocation and encrypted technologies. Malapo also has interests with the FARM, a data center controlled by South African State Security in Midrand between Johannesburg and Pretoria, and Workers Health. All of the Malepo companies appear to be shell companies that transact illicit business around the globe, including with Iran. But while Iran is one of the primary "clients" behind the ANC's recent series of legal attacks on Israel in international courts, it is not the only beneficiary or interlocutor on this issue. Irina Tsukerman, a national security and human rights lawyer, journalist, and geopolitical analyst, is a Fellow at the Arabian Peninsula Institute and a Fellow at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
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