The different styles of conservatism in Canada
By Mark Wegierski
web posted October 20, 2003
On October 15, 2003, the prospects of the broader right in Canada brightened
somewhat for the first time in decades. Overcoming years of negativity, the
Canadian Alliance (which had emerged out of the Reform Party of Canada in
1998-2000), and the federal Progressive Conservative party agreed to unite
themselves (pending the approval of their memberships by December 12, 2003),
as the Conservative Party of Canada (the former name of the Progressive Conservatives
from decades ago).
In today's Canada, there is, unfortunately, little attention paid to the
fine distinctions on the Right side of the political spectrum. It was therefore
refreshing to see an attempt at distinguishing between such right-wing factions
as paleoconservatives, neoconservatives, and "modern social conservatives",
in young political commentator Michael Taube's important article ("There's
more to a conservative than meets the eye", Calgary Herald,
26 August 2000). The Herald, a large-circulation newspaper,
is located in
the Western Canadian city which is often considered the capital of Canadian
conservatism, and it is somewhat open to more nuanced approaches in describing
the Right.
There are many different, broadly right-wing factions in Canada, however
most of them have a comparatively minor influence on the public scene. The
perennially ruling Liberal Party has a 'right-wing' which has embraced a
degree of fiscal sense, but remains thoroughly socially-liberal. The federal
Progressive Conservative party, which currently has 15 MPs, has often had
'ultra-moderates' or 'Red Tories' exerting the most influence on it. The
Progressive Conservative parties in the various provinces are of varying
ideological complexions. Mike Harris, the former Premier of Ontario (elected
in 1995 and 1999) was able to drag the provincial Progressive Conservative
party in a right-wing direction, although his activism was mostly confined
to economic and fiscal issues. The Canadian Alliance (which elected 66 MPs
in the November 2000 federal election, mostly from Western Canada) (and which
exists solely at the federal level) is probably the main home for so-called
small-c conservatives today. (The term 'small-c conservative' arose in Canada
as a result of the fact that the Progressive Conservative party -- or 'big-C'
Conservatives -- had almost entirely abandoned conservatism.)
In the United States, there is clearly much more of a sense of space and
debate within the generalized right-wing, between such groupings as paleoconservatives,
social conservatives, neoconservatives, libertarians, paleolibertarians,
right-wing Greens, 'social conservatives of the Left' (such as Christopher
Lasch), classical liberals, religious conservatives (sometimes called 'theocons'),
and so forth.
To most people, paleoconservatism and social conservatism would appear to
be almost coterminous. The central point of Taube's article, however, seemed
to be to drive apart the positions of paleoconservatism and so-called modern
social conservatism. Some would argue that the differences between the groupings
are matters of emphasis, rather than of substance. A proposed definition
embracing both paleoconservatism and 'modern social conservatism' is those
outlooks upholding and valuing traditional nation, family, and religion,
as well as a real work-ethic, and strict law and order.
In his article, Taube finds the paleoconservatives' emphasis on nationhood
too robust, yet it is really of the same type as the 'modern social conservative'
criticism of multiculturalism, excessive aboriginal claims (a major issue
in Canada), and uncontrolled immigration. The paleoconservatives are usually
more willing to say and write openly what most modern social conservatives
believe.
Taube also accuses the paleoconservatives of being tied to "a conspiracy-oriented
theory such as a managerial class". However, there is much accumulating
evidence of a "managerial-therapeutic regime" in current-day Western
societies. One could look to Paul Gottfried's After Liberalism: Mass
Democracy in the Managerial State (Princeton University Press, 1999),
or any recent issues of the eclectic scholarly New York-based journal Telos for analyses
of the situation. There can be perceived a constant pre-empting of discourse
against social conservatives, in the mass media and mass-education systems,
the state bureaucracies and social services, and the courts. Modern social
conservatives are quite aware of the various powerful structures arrayed
against them.
Thirdly, although some paleoconservatives may tend to define themselves
in terms of culture and politics, rather than religion, this does not mean
that they are hostile to religion. And many are in fact very strictly religious.
One can also uphold religion very strongly for cultural and political reasons.
The notion that "most Canadian social conservatives" would somehow
be placed far outside paleoconservatism because of their religious faith,
is ridiculous.
As for the opposition to capitalism and globalization, there indeed paleoconservatives
differ from most modern-day conservatives. However, it could be argued that
the exaltation of globalization, internationalism, and capitalism, has grown
increasingly prominent among the more generalized right-wing as a result
of the ascendancy of the neoconservatives. Surely, modern social conservatives
are also aware of many negative aspects of capitalism. Most of the mass-media
cultural industries often criticized by social conservatives (for example,
Hollywood, television, advertising, rock music, pornography) operate on a
strictly free-market, for-profit basis. And the huge, bureaucratic, transnational
corporations can simply be seen as part of the "managerial-therapeutic
regime," which are also at war with what social conservatives esteem.
There is today the unfortunate tendency to label the most carefully-voiced
criticisms of out-of-control technology,
capitalism, and globalization as Marxist, fascist or neo-Luddite.
Taube, while by contemporary standards a highly respectful critic of paleoconservatism,
finds that outlook rather unsatisfactory.
The sharp political point of his article comes at the end: "Modern
social conservatives are not, have never been, will never be, and should
not aspire to be like paleoconservatives. And in truth, why would they ever
want to join them?" It could be argued that paleoconservatives and modern
social conservatives, united by the principles of upholding traditional nation,
family, and religion, as well as a real work-ethic and strict law and order,
do indeed have much in common. These two similar outlooks are clearly comparatively
weak in Canada.
Regardless of their comparative weakness in Canada today, the outlooks of
paleoconservatives and modern social conservatives are clearly not coterminous
with those of neoconservatives, libertarians, or 'Red Tories'. To paleoconservatives,
neoconservatives are gung-ho capitalists who disdain the true common good;
libertarians are libertines; and 'Red Tories' are seen as opportunists within
the Progressive Conservative party who have largely adopted left-liberal
outlooks. Admittedly, the term 'Red Tory' can have a more elevated meaning,
as in the thought of Canadian philosopher George Parkin Grant, where it becomes
a "social conservatism of the Left" -- but on the other hand, it
can also be used to describe some of the pedestrian Progressive Conservative
party hacks, who had earlier inveighed against the supposed 'bigotry' of
the Reform Party.
It cannot be expected that the paleoconservatives' and social conservatives'
distinct identity is to be entirely melded with and into neoconservatism,
libertarianism, or Red Toryism. For example, because of their appreciation
for 'the truly social', paleoconservatives are unlikely to unqualifiedly
embrace capitalism. The desire for upholding some kind of 'true Tory' welfare-state
in Canada would, in fact, also be more popular than the economically strident,
but socially flaccid outlooks of many free-market boosters. Paleoconservatives
should also be able to see much that is worthwhile in the passionate attachment
of the Quebecois nationalists to Quebec, and in their visceral disdain for
federal state centralism.
It could be argued that paleoconservative and social conservative philosophical
outlooks, despite their reputation of obdurate reaction, contain within them
various aspects that allow for some degree of coalition building with various
other outlooks -- some of them perhaps unexpected, such as ecology.
It may be that trying to solidly define oneself, and to engage in reflective
thought as to what one represents, is more conducive to true coalition-building,
than the attempt to embrace everything. The sensitivity of paleoconservatism
and social conservatism to 'the truly social' mentioned above offers a certain
nuance to their views that is lacking in the usual neoconservative boosterism
of unrestricted capitalism and unlimited technology as panacea. There are
many aspects of capitalism today that are harsh and ugly. And profound concern
for the environment should not be written off as tree-hugging lunacy. At
the same time, paleoconservatives resist the dogmas of political-correctness,
and do not wish to be associated with those tendencies in 'the official Right'
(typified by Canadian 'Red Tories', many neoconservatives, and some libertarians)
that heavily defer to these.
Paleoconservatives and social conservatives are very likely to remain in
critical opposition towards late modern society. However, some of their critiques
might begin to have an impact on the thoughts and actions of a significant
number of persons. It could be argued that keeping one's outlook in coherent,
uncompromised existence, makes it far more likely that at some point it will
indeed influence people's hearts and minds, which might then lead to substantial
shifts in public policy.
Mark Wegierski is a Canadian writer and historical researcher.
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