Erring on the side of hidden harm: The granting of domestic violence restraining orders By David Heleniak On September 19, 2005, Yvette Cade went before Judge Richard A. Palumbo seeking an extension of a domestic violence restraining order against her husband, Roger Hargrave. Palumbo, whether from confusion, clerical error, or a genuine belief that the extension was unwarranted, dismissed the restraining order. One month later, Hargrave walked into the cell phone store where Cade worked, doused her with gasoline, and set her on fire. Two weeks after the attack, Palumbo was removed from all domestic violence cases and placed on administrative duty. On July 20, 2006, Cade was interviewed by Nancy Grace on CNN's Headline Prime. Grace, emblematic of the media reaction, introduced the interview with:
Adding to this, one of Grace's other guests, Congressman Ted Poe, commented: "Well, Nancy, you know I believe that judges need to be accountable for their actions just like we make criminals accountable. And this judge, whether it's a mistake or incompetence on his part, he needs to leave the bench." A judicial misconduct hearing scheduled for the end of August was cancelled when Palumbo announced he planned to retire on August 4th because of health problems. Whether or not the horrific criminal act committed by Hargrave would have been prevented had Palumbo extended the restraining order, the Yvette Cade tragedy and the ensuing backlash against Palumbo is likely to have just one result. As if things weren't bad enough already in the family courts, judges are going to be even more likely to grant restraining orders, regardless of the facts, rather than risk being held responsible for a similar tragedy. Economists have long realized that Food and Drug Administration (FDA) officials, in deciding whether to approve a drug, face the possibility of making two errors--they can approve a drug that turns out to be unsafe and/or ineffective, type I, or they can disapprove an effective drug that is, in fact, safe, type II--and have an incentive to make one type of error over the other. A classic example of type I error, given by former FDA official Henry I. Miller, M.D., is the FDA's approval in 1976 of the swine flu vaccine.
A classic example of Type II error, given by economist Walter E. Williams, is the FDA's failure to approve the use of beta-blockers, available in Europe since 1967, until 1976.
Economist Thomas W. Hazlett sums it up this way: "Type I deaths result in headlines reading, ‘FDA-Approved Drug Kills Pregnant Mother, Congressional Hearings Slated.' Type II deaths don't generate headlines, or even little blurbs. There are no visible victims to lay on the regulator's doorstep when potential beneficiaries are only statistical probabilities." As Miller confides, "Because a regulatory official's career might be damaged irreparably by his good faith but mistaken approval of a high-profile product, decisions are often made defensively--in other words, to avoid type 1 errors at any cost." Although it is not politically correct to say so, women can and do use false allegations of domestic violence to gain sole custody and to get their children to hate and fear their fathers. Even when a restraining order doesn't snowball into complete parental alienation, a judge's declaration that a father is an abuser can permanently tarnish his image in his child's eyes. The damage to father/child relationships and to children's mental health caused by the overzealous entering of restraining orders, however, is seldom if ever reported, while the harm caused by overtly violent acts following the failure to enter restraining orders most certainly is. Just like FDA officials worrying about the headlines, judges deciding whether to enter domestic violence restraining orders have their careers to think about in addition to the merits of the particular cases before them. When in doubt, they err on the side of hidden harm.Facts should be determined by several fresh, open minds, not one with a career on the line. Jurors, relatively anonymous one-time actors in the judicial system, are far less concerned with extraneous matters than are judges. In the wake of the Yvette Cade tragedy, it is more critical than ever that juries, not judges, be used to decide when domestic violence restraining orders are warranted. David Heleniak is an attorney in Morristown, NJ, and the author of "The New Star Chamber: The New Jersey Family Court and the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act."
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