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The franchising
of Hezbollah
By Avi Davis
web
posted January 6, 2002
Those seeking to identify a date for the commencement of the pitiless
Muslim extremist campaign against America, should forget September 11,
2001. There is a far better candidate for that distinction. October 23,
1983 stands as America's first post-World War Two day of infamy. That
was the morning Hezbollah guerillas ended the lives of 241 Marines and
over 70 French soldiers at the Beirut barracks of the multi-national peace-keeping
forces in Beirut. The event claims its mark on history on two counts.
It was the first time a Muslim extremist group had caused mass casualties
against a U. S. target. It was also the first time since the Second World
War that a U.S. military force had failed to seek retribution for a mass
attack against American servicemen. Acting under a cautious warning from
Caspar Weinberg, Ronald Reagans' Secretary of Defense, the Administration
rejected retaliation against Hezbollah so as not to threaten a shaky relationship
with Saudi Arabia. Instead, American forces were quickly recalled from
Lebanon.
The failure to launch any significant reprisal against this slaughter
of American peace keepers, coupled with the hasty retreat was to have
catastrophic repercussions. Emboldened by its success, Hezbollah's power
and prestige in southern Lebanon was greatly enhanced. In the next five
years it consolidated its political control over southern Lebanon and
took pride in the harassment of the Israeli forces lodged in the 14 mile
security zone the Israelis had created following their 1982 invasion.
From 1983 through 1992 the Israelis suffered 49 suicide attacks by Hezbollah
guerillas. Israel's hasty withdrawal in May 2000, mimicking the earlier
U.S. retreat, only confirmed what many Muslim extremists had concluded
17 years earlier: neither the Israeli nor American military machines had
the stomach for mass losses or for combating the threat of suicide bombing.
For the past twenty years Hezbollah, strengthened by support from the
Iranian Mullahs and given freedom of movement by the nominal rulers of
Lebanon in Syria, became the virtual government of southern Lebanon. In
doing so it began the development of an international network of financiers
and fund raising operations that created a steady flow of both arms and
cash into southern Lebanon. Quietly Hezbollah became the model and inspiration
for all extremist Muslim factions Sunni and Shi'ite alike.
It should therefore come as little surprise that investigations into
the Paradise Hotel bombing and the attack on the Arkia plane in Mombassa
are pointing to the likelihood of collusion between Hezbollah and al-Qaida.
In fact a clear pattern is emerging that suggests Hezbollah is actively
cooperating with al-Qaida. Western intelligence has now revealed a high
level of cooperation between Bin Laden and Imad Muganiyeh, the Hezbullah
terrorist who masterminded some of Hezbollah's most spectacular atrocities
and kidnappings in Lebanon. Reports have Muganiyeh first meeting with
Bin Laden as early as 1995 and those meetings have continued regularly
ever since.
More than this, since al-Qaida fled Afghanistan at the end of last year,
the Sunday Telegraph reports, between 80 and 100 al-Qaida fighters were
provided with false passports by Hezbollah before being relocated to southern
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The same report acknowledges that Hezbollah,
working hand in hand with al-Qaida, has set up cells in the Far East --
including Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore.
It is well known that Hezbollah has operated in Gaza and the West Bank
for years, but the recent revelation by the Shin Bet in Israel - that
al- Qaida has now also joined them there -- is chilling evidence of a
new level of cooperation previously unsuspected.
Therefore in a post-Saddam world, bringing down Hezbollah, whose headquarters
and whereabouts is no secret, should become the American military's number
one priority. Operating in conjunction with the IDF, the Hezbollah operation
in Southern Lebanon must be brought to its knees, its operatives throughout
the world identified and eliminated, its financial network dismantled.
Syria and Iran must be threatened with reprisals for their continued financial
and strategic support of Hezbollah and Saudia Arabia should be made to
pay the diplomatic price for its double-faced attitude to the war on terror.
Pursuing al-Qaida may well slake a justified American thirst for revenge.
But eliminating that organization's progenitor and model may, in the meantime,
be just as effective in conveying a message to the purveyors of terror
that the U.S. government failed, so critically, to deliver19 years ago.
Avi Davis is the senior fellow of the Freeman Center for Strategic
Studies in Los Angeles.

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